Fukuyama on Nationalism and Class

Francis Fukuyama is one of the big thinkers of our generation.  
The question he asked in his 1989 essay “The End of History?” was
answered in his 1992 book “The End of History and the Last Man.”  The question was dropped in
favor of a simple declaratory sentence.  History, characterized by
ideological conflict, was over.  Western liberal democracy won. It was a
notable example of the triumphalism at the end of the Cold War.

Fukuyama has understandably modified his views over the past quarter of a
century, and he now offers another paradigm.  He sees Trump’s election
in the US as ushering in a new age of populist nationalism.

Class, which is the education level,
determines the way people think about politics, according to Fukuyama.   He
imagines that it is the poorly educated who have not done well economically who
have become passionately anti-elitist.  He recognizes that they do not see
themselves in economic terms, but rather racial, ethnicity or nationality
terms. 

Of course, education and income are often highly correlated.  Silver
tried to tease out the more significant variable by finding counties that had a high education but low income (e.g. counties government, or
hospitals or educational institutions were significant employers.  Clinton
did well.  In countries where education was
lower, but incomes were strong.  Trump outperformed Romney in most
of the counties that incomes were well above the national median and where a
little more than a third of voters had a college degree.  

Fukuyama’s argument seems to be predicated
on the link between education and economic well-being. 
However, this link appears to be weakening.  In the US and UK, which have
typically experienced more social mobility than continental Europe, young
people are entering the labor market with considerably less mobility than their
parents or grandparents.   The link between social class origin and
education attainment remains close.  

There is greater differentiation between elite and common colleges and
universities.  That differentiation seems to be, at least in part, a
response to the success of a larger percentage of the population getting a
college degree.  Also, a large number of college graduates are working at
jobs that don’t typically require a college degree,  On average in 2015,
nearly 45% of the recent US college graduates had such jobs.  It has been
rising since the end of the tech bubble
when it had been a little below 38%.  

Income equality may also play a role.  The earnings of the
highest 10% are much higher compared to the overall population.   “In the presence of increasing equality,” the UMass economists argued,
” falling mobility implies that as
the rungs on the ladder have moved further apart, moving between them has
become more difficult.”  

There are some studies that show
that technology-related job disruption that resulted in manufacturing job losses and contributed to the wage stagnation
for the better part of two decades has begun impacting a wide swathe of white
collar professionals, including accountants, lawyers,
and doctors.  Lawyers and doctors increasingly
become employees rather than small business owners.  A majority of
lawyers work for private and corporate legal offices and government.  This appears to be the first year that a
majority of doctors in the US work for large hospital conglomerates than
private practice. 

Social mobility in Continental Europe typically lags behind the Anglo-American
economies.   We have been skeptical of claims that
populist-nationalism is sweeping across the world.  We have linked the
success of the populist-nationalist agenda to the two-party system in the US and UK.  The populist parties did
not win there, but part of their agenda was
adopted by the center-right party in both countries.  It may have
also been partly a function of the loss of upward social mobility. 
Expectations not being met may be fueling the political response.  

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